Robots, autonomous systems, and other cyber-physical systems are often affected by stochastic disturbances, sensor noise, and model mismatch during operation. Even from the same initial state, a controller may induce different system trajectories. For safety-critical tasks, average performance or a small number of successful trajectories is therefore insufficient to characterize system risk.
A reach-avoid task combines reachability and safety: the system must eventually enter a designated target region while remaining outside the unsafe region until it reaches the target. Because the system trajectory is stochastic, this requirement is generally expressed in terms of the probability with which the task is completed, rather than as an assumption of absolute success.
Learning-enabled control methods can use data to address complex, nonlinear, and high-dimensional systems, but training data and finite simulations cover only a limited set of states and disturbance samples. A high empirical success rate does not automatically imply that the controller satisfies the specification for every state in the initial set, under the stated disturbance distribution, and over an infinite time horizon. Safety-critical systems therefore require formal analysis that makes the conditions, scope, and probability lower bound of a guarantee explicit.